

# Hartz-Horowitz at Twenty: Nationalism, Toryism and Socialism in Canada and the United States\*

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Any overview of Canadian political thought or political culture must reckon with Horowitz's adaptation of Hartz, for it is one of the few things in the field that practically everyone has read and remembers.<sup>1</sup> But what exactly is the Hartz-Horowitz theory? What was the original and why did it need adaptation?<sup>2</sup> How does the adaptation differ from the original? What are its strengths and weaknesses?

This article highlights a simple fact: Hartzian analysis flourishes in Canada, while it languishes in the United States. Different adaptations of Hartz compete for the attention of Canadians. The most successful of these is now required reading in innumerable university courses on Canadian politics. It has provoked continuing debate: there are historical studies of the Loyalists and of conservatism generally, content

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1 Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 32 (1966), 143-71, reprinted with some additions and slight modifications in *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 3-44, 57. Quotations from these sources are hereafter acknowledged parenthetically in the text, using the abbreviations "CLS" and CLP, respectively. If the quoted material is the same or practically so in both sources, references to both will be given. If there is a significant difference between them, only the first will be quoted and cited.

2 See Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955), and Louis Hartz et al., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964). References hereafter to these sources will be parenthetical, using the abbreviations LTA and FNS, respectively.

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analyses of the Confederation Debates as well as more conventional studies of the political thought of the Confederation period, systematic comparisons of the political parties and their electoral support, even rigorously empirical studies of student attitudes, all designed to test the Hartz-Horowitz theory.<sup>3</sup> Horowitz's 29-page article has eclipsed a 360-page book published the same year on roughly the same subject;<sup>4</sup> it provides the framework for the most widely used textbook of parties and ideologies in Canada;<sup>5</sup> and it has been mentioned in popular books by leading journalists.<sup>6</sup> How has Hartzian analysis fared in the United

- 3 Kenneth McNaught, "Comment," in John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), *Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism* (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 409-20; S. F. Wise, "Liberal Consensus or Ideological Battleground: Some Reflections on the Hartz Thesis," *Canadian Historical Association Papers*, 1974, 1-14; Conrad Winn and James Twiss, "The Spatial Analysis of Political Cleavages and the Case of the Ontario Legislature," this JOURNAL 10 (1977), 287-310; Tom Truman, "A Scale for Measuring a Tory Streak in Canada and the United States," this JOURNAL 10 (1977), 597-614; Rod Preece, "The Myth of the Red Tory," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 1 (1977), 3-28; Gad Horowitz, "The 'Myth' of the Red Tory?" *ibid.* 1 (1977), 87-88; Rod Preece, "Tory Myth and Conservative Reality: Horowitz Revisited," *ibid.* 2 (1978), 175-79; William Christian, "A Note on Rod Preece and Red Tories," *ibid.* 2 (1978), 128-34; Rod Preece, "Liberal-Conservatism and Feudalism in Canadian Politics: A Response to Christian," *ibid.* 2 (1978), 135-41; K. D. McRae, "Louis Hartz's Concept of the Fragment Society and Its Application to Canada," *Études canadiennes* 5 (1978), 17-30; Gad Horowitz, "Notes on 'Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada,'" this JOURNAL 11 (1978), 383-99; Walter C. Soderlund, Ralph C. Nelson, and Ronald H. Wagenberg, "A Critique of the Hartz Theory of Political Development as Applied to Canada," *Comparative Politics* 12 (1979), 63-85; Nelson Wiseman, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," *Queen's Quarterly* 88 (1981), 298-315; and Roger Gibbins and Neil Nevitte, "Canadian Political Ideology: A Comparative Analysis," this JOURNAL 18 (1985), 577-98. See also David V. J. Bell, "The Loyalist Tradition in Canada," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 5 (1970), 22-33; André-J. Bélanger, *L'Apolitisme des idéologies québécoises: le grand tournant de 1934-1936* (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1974); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Radicalism in North America: A Comparative View of the Party Systems in Canada and the United States," *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* (Series 4) 14 (1976), 19-55; Conrad Winn and John McMenemy, *Political Parties in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976); William Christian, "Ideology and Canadian Politics," in John H. Redekop (ed.), *Approaches to Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1978); David Bell and Lorne Tepperman, *The Roots of Disunity: A Look at Canadian Political Culture* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Historical Traditions and National Characteristics: A Comparative Analysis of Canada and the United States," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 11 (1986), 113-55; and Peter J. Smith, "The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation," this JOURNAL 20 (1987), 3-29.
- 4 G. P. deT. Glazebrook, *A History of Canadian Political Thought* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966).
- 5 William Christian and Colin Campbell, *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada: Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Nationalists* (2nd ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983).
- 6 Charles Taylor, *Radical Tories: The Conservative Tradition in Canada* (Toronto:

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**Abstract.** Twenty years' debate have revealed many weaknesses in the Hartz-Horowitz interpretation of conservatism, liberalism, and socialism in Canada, but it continues to be widely taught, for it provides a simple and appealing explanation for some striking differences between Canadian and American politics. This article argues that the interpretation is best understood as a form of neo-Marxism, that its basic weaknesses are most easily seen by examining its treatment of French Canada, and that its explanation for the exceptional strength of socialism in English Canada, linking socialism to Toryism, can be strengthened by linking both socialism and Toryism to nationalism.

**Résumé.** L'interprétation de la pensée politique canadienne a été grandement influencée par les idées de Louis Hartz. Sa soi-disant « théorie du fragment » fut formulée au cours des années cinquante pour expliquer la faiblesse du socialisme aux États-Unis. Les difficultés d'insérer le Canada français dans cette théorie démontrent les limitations. Les concepts qui la soutiennent déforment l'élément religieux et nient le libéralisme de la pensée politique canadienne-française. Néanmoins, la théorie, avec les modifications introduites par Gad Horowitz, a connu un grand succès au Canada anglais, peut-être à cause de son lien avec le nationalisme anglo-canadien.

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States? Any broad generalization about the thinking and scholarly output of America's tens of thousands of Political Science and History graduate students and professors must, of course, ignore some detail. But plainly there is nothing like ten times the volume of controversy about Hartzian questions in the United States that there is in Canada. Hartzian scholarship shows little vitality in the United States. The Hartzian approach does not eclipse other approaches; it has been eclipsed. Indeed, it is practically dead.

How are we to account for this striking difference in the fortunes of Hartzianism in two very similar societies? Can we claim to understand Canadian or American political culture fully before we have interpreted this hard fact?

The following interpretation begins with an explanation of the Hartzian approach, a brief statement of a simple objection to it, and a more careful examination of the ground rules of Hartzian analysis. It goes on to consider Horowitz's adaptation of Hartz, some of the attacks on it, and some of the arguments in its defence. The article concludes with a discussion of a key factor identified by the Hartzian approach, national feeling, its relation to socialism, and its relevance for understanding the different fortunes of Hartzianism in Canada and the United States.

## **1. The Hartzian Approach**

Hartz strove to see America "from the angle of Europe" (*FNS*, vii). He wrote in defence of the European view of America. But which European

Anansi, 1982), 114-15, 175, 182-83; Richard Gwyn, *The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 169-71; and Ron Graham, *One-Eyed Kings: Promise and Illusion in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Collins, 1986), 128.

view? Hartz does not discuss the different European views of America, and he provides only brief and not very helpful comments about European politics. It is difficult to say, therefore, from exactly what angle Hartz approached America. But no reader of his two books can be unaware of his great interest in Marx's theory of feudalism, capitalism and socialism.

Marx looked back to the origins of modern Europe in the breakdown of feudalism, and forward to the consummation of what Hartz calls "the European revolution" in the building of a truly free and equal society. The middle term of the Marxian historical drama is capitalism or liberalism. Feudalism gives rise to the capitalist bourgeoisie which eventually destroys its own foundations. Bourgeois revolutionaries trumpeting the principles of liberty and equality serve their own interests as a commercial and manufacturing class, but also the interest of humanity in the expansion of the forces of production. Their reforms eventually create the proletariat—the vast majority of wage workers, huddled together in great cities, living on starvation wages, full of envy and resentment, the dynamite that will eventually blast humanity from capitalism into socialism and communism.

North America is puzzling from this angle, for it offers the most advanced capitalism, with huge factories, gargantuan cities, super monopolies, ferocious competition, and violent swings between prosperity and depression: but no dynamite—just cheerful workers and friendly businessmen. Socialism is singularly weak in America. Socialism does not arise automatically, it seems, out of the requirements of advancing modern society (*FNS*, 46).

Hartz provides a solution to this puzzle. Rather than abandoning the historical paradigm that gives rise to it, he develops a supplementary hypothesis under the rubric "the relative autonomy of the superstructure." America was "born free." The first Americans (leaving aside the native peoples) were a "fragment" of seventeenth-century England fleeing feudal and clerical oppression. They came to a new land free of Gothic encrustations, and there they built a new society on the basis of freedom of contract. No more favourable setting could be imagined for trying such a Lockian experiment, and Americans, generally speaking, have been pleased with its results. Indeed Lockian liberalism, developing unchallenged on the free land of America, quickly forgot its roots in European thought and was transmuted into American nationalism. The ideology the first Americans brought with them from Europe has long since sunk beneath the surface of thought; it has become an "absolute" or "universal," the framework within which Americans conduct their public life, the dogma they impose on new immigrants, and the distorting lens through which they see other nations in international politics. "An absolute and

irrational attachment" to Locke (*LTA*, 6) explains both American indifference to socialism at home and its "irrational anticommunist frenzy" (*LTA*, 285) when it confronts socialism abroad.

To understand the American political mind, Hartz suggests, one must understand the "psychic magic" (*FNS*, 5, 15, 20, 53) of nationalism—"not an argument but an emotion: one of the most powerful social emotions of modern times" (*LTA*, 207). This emotion tends to put strict limits on American political thinking, converting domestic nonconformity into heresy or even treason, and foreign eccentricity into sin. But the changing world situation since about 1945—the shrinking of the globe by modern technology and the spread of the European revolution to distant lands—has fortunately put fragmentation into reverse: the European revolution which America escaped in the seventeenth century is now suddenly being forced back upon the fragment. This "crashing impact of the rest of the world" intensifies nationalist blindness in some, like Senator Joseph McCarthy, but it serves to educate others (*LTA*, 287). The younger generation, in particular, can no longer be kept from seeing the "fragment" character of America and the relativity of its ethic. Painful as this discovery may be for some, it brings with it "a moral liberation" and "the hope of philosophy" (*FNS*, 23). There is no iron determinism here, of course. At the end of *The Liberal Tradition in America* Hartz leaves his readers "hanging in the air." But his challenge to American provincialism is clear: "What is at stake is nothing less than a new level of consciousness, a transcending of irrational Lockianism, in which an understanding of self and an understanding of others go hand in hand" (*LTA*, 308).

The Hartzian analysis of American political thought follows a few simple rules that are easily applied to other "fragment" societies. In *The Founding of New Societies* Hartz wrote of "a purely mechanistic process" with three stages, "the extrication from Europe, the atrophy of the future, and the unfolding of the fragment potential" (*FNS*, 6, 15, 24). The process begins with the departure of a group from Europe that represents one phase of its continuing revolution, a fragment of its rich ideological spectrum. Hartz distinguished three types of fragments: feudal (French Canada, Latin America), bourgeois or liberal (the United States, English Canada, Dutch South Africa), and radical (Australia, British South Africa). These fragments, detached from the whole of which they were once parts, lose "the stimulus toward change that the whole provides."

There is a process of contagion at work in Europe, enormously subtle and ramifying, in which ideologies give birth to one another over time. This process actually begins with the feudal world which, in a queer Hegelian sense, helps to generate the very attack against it. That world not only gives its own "class consciousness" to every Enlightenment ideology, bourgeois or socialist, but it

holds out as well the memory of a corporate community which, in the midst of revolution, men seek to recapture (*FNS*, 6-7).

A comparable process of contagion and renewal works within the fragments, but on a much narrower range of materials. They remain fixed, so to speak, at their points of origin, lapsing into "a kind of immobility." For example, liberal fragments, lacking feudalism, never generate socialism. "There is a stifling of the future as well as an escape from the past, and it is at the heart of the process of fragmentation that the one is determined by the other" (*FNS*, 6). This does not mean absolute fixity, however. Freedom from ideological challenge means freedom for the fragment ideology to unfold within itself. There is not just liberalism in America, for example, but Whig liberalism, Jacobin or democratic liberalism, and even Liberal Reform (which some of its enemies condemn as creeping socialism). "The fixity of the fragment liberates in the end a rich interior development" (*FNS*, 6).

Hartz and his collaborators applied this scheme to most of the world's fragment societies. Hartz himself provided a chapter in *The Founding of New Societies* summing up his interpretation of the United States. Among the other surveys in this volume, McRae's on French and English Canada is obviously the most relevant for this article. The first Hartzian analysis of Canadian politics, it provides good reasons for doubting the Hartzian classification of French Canada as a feudal fragment.

## 2. Feudalism or Catholicism?

Summing up the political thinking of a society in one word is no small challenge, particularly when that society is caught in political institutions hostile to its bent of mind. The word Hartz chose for French Canada is *feudal*. Is it the right word? What does it mean?

Hartz is remarkably vague about the "feudalism" of his feudal fragments. His most interesting comment is the disarming one, at the beginning of *The Liberal Tradition in America*, that he intends to use "broad terms broadly" (*LTA*, 3). Hartz is here anticipating objections to his basic thesis that America was from its earliest years a liberal, not a feudal, society. One difficulty is that "feudal" is often used "technically" to refer to "the institutions of the medieval era," and some of these can be found in America, "even in the eighteenth century," for example, "primogeniture, entail, and quitrents" (*LTA*, 3).<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, "feudalism" broadly understood is better than

7 Another is those "aspects of our original life in the Puritan colonies and the South"—theocracy and slavery?—that are not well described as *liberal*, even when the term is used "in the classic Lockian sense." Fortunately *liberal* is an even vaguer

"corporatism," Hartz claims, to describe the main thing the Pilgrim Fathers did *not* bring with them on the Mayflower.

Every significant description implies a contrast, and the contrast here is with French Canada and Latin America, Hartz's feudal fragments. These fragments differ from the United States because their founders brought different ideological baggage. Even if they left the Old World after the Pilgrims, they left before the liberal revolutions in their homelands, and they did not put Locke in their luggage. When they established themselves in the New World, they reproduced the feudal institutions and habits of mind with which they were familiar.

Little would come of any closer scrutiny of Hartz's very brief remarks about what feudalism is; more will come of examining what he says feudal fragments cannot become. A feudal fragment is essentially fixed at its point of origin. The process of fragmentation, and the fragment's isolation from the rich ideological diversity of the Old World, prevent its developing the later phases of political thought—Whig liberalism, democratic liberalism, Liberal Reform, and socialism—until the outside world crashes in on it after the Second World War. "The feudal fragmentation, starting earliest, has the longest 'future' to exorcise, the longest reach, as it were, of all the detachments from Europe." In place of the standard European progression towards socialism, there will be a "rich interior development" of feudalism itself. "There is a remarkable creativity about the unfolding of the feudal ethos which [this bleak train of fixity] makes possible" (*FNS*, 26). The feudal fragments thus fit the formula abstracted from American history: extrication from Europe, atrophy of the future, and unfolding of the fragment potential. French Canada, let it be noted, is said to be one of "the purest cases of fragment traditionalism" (*FNS*, 14, 31).

How well, in fact, does all this fit the French-Canadian case? Not very well, it seems. McRae begins his contribution to *The Founding of New Societies* by pointing out that French feudalism was moribund by the time relatively large numbers of French settlers came to the colony on the St. Lawrence, between 1663 and 1681. France was then an absolute monarchy, at the zenith of its power, and its colony was a deliberate projection of its institutions into the New World. The colony could not be simply a mirror image of the mother country, given its circumstances and the difficulty of communication with the central government, but neither was it a collection of feudal baronies. "In its law and institutions the colony reflected the prevailing ethos of authoritarianism to an even greater degree than did the more complex and less malleable society of old France" (*FNS*, 221). Its system of land tenure was "seigneurial," and thus formally "feudal," but in reality the

term than *feudal*. Its precise meaning presents no "insuperable barrier" to the "large generalization" Hartz favours (*LTA*, 4).

seigneurs were "unsalaried agents of the Crown for the settlement of the colony" (*FNS*, 224). In short, McRae favours *absolutism* or *authoritarianism* rather than *feudalism* to describe New France.<sup>8</sup>

Does "feudalism" describe French Canada any better after 1759? Wolfe's capture of Quebec brought the outside world with its liberal revolution crashing in, 200 years ahead of schedule. Does it make any sense after that date to analyze French Canada as an independent society, cut off from its origins and other outside influences, its future atrophying and its feudalism unfolding? Where is that "rich interior development" of feudalism the Hartzian theory requires? Hard as it may be to find classic feudalism in New France, it is harder still to find its supposed offshoots—romantic feudalism? democratic feudalism? Feudal Reform?—in French Canada between 1759 and 1945. What can be found is liberalism: the rebellions, responsible government, the *Instituts Canadiens*, the commutation of seigneurial tenure, the establishment of public schools (on a denominational basis, to be sure, but with remarkably little of the intolerance supposedly characteristic of "one-myth cultures"), the broadening of the franchise, the growth of political parties (especially the Liberal party), and generally the growth of a liberal democratic regime. The important opposition to this broad trend came not from the partisans of "primogeniture, entail, and quitrents" (or their French equivalents), but from the Ultramontanes—those who favoured the centralized and self-consciously anti-liberal form of Catholicism that developed after 1848 and that triumphed with the proclamation of the dogma of papal infallibility in 1870. This tendency within Catholicism held no brief for "feudalism," but it was plainly suspicious of Protestantism and liberalism and tended to favour "corporatist" rather than laissez-faire or socialist economic reforms.<sup>9</sup>

### 3. Truth in Modelling

French Canada, far from taking the wind out of Hartz's sails, drives him on to a kind of victory over all possible opponents. He disposes of the problem French Canada represents in a long footnote to his discussion of feudal fragments. To understand what he says there, one must appreciate the full extent of Hartz's difficulties with his "feudal" category.

8 Compare McRae, "Hartz's Concept of the Fragment Society," 21.

9 Soderlund, Nelson and Wagenberg refer to "an ideological conflict totally out of keeping with the coherence which should characterize the elite of a fragment culture such as that of mid-nineteenth century French Canada, which Hartz cites as an exemplary case of the purity of fragment cultures." They add that Hartzians, "harnessed to an a priori theory . . . want to stress the ephemeral aspects of liberalism in Quebec" ("Critique of the Hartz Theory," 81, 82). Compare Wise, "Liberal Consensus or Ideological Battleground," 9-11.



The basic problem is quite simple: there is no apparent reason why fragmentation—extrication, atrophy, and unfolding—should occur in a feudal fragment. It may make sense to say that liberal fragments, having left feudalism behind, cannot develop (or welcome) socialism, but what did feudal fragments leave behind that keeps them from developing (or welcoming) liberalism and socialism? “Even if feudalism ‘fragments,’ that is, leaves Europe and goes to another place, will it not in the end produce an Enlightenment out of its own resources? After all, prior to the first Whig thrust in Europe, there were only the Middle Ages” (*FNS*, 27). If feudalism in the Old World can produce liberalism and socialism out of itself, why not in the New World?<sup>10</sup>

French Canada posed this problem in a particularly perplexing way, since all the ingredients seemed to be present there for producing socialism. Hartz had contended that socialism did not develop in the United States because “the feudal factor” was missing. French Canada, by contrast, evidently combined “feudalism,” liberalism, and industrialism. Why then no socialism? Was something wrong with the recipe?<sup>11</sup> Hartz did not claim that French Canada was an Arcadia untouched by steam and electricity, nor that socialism was stronger in French Canada than in English Canada and the United States, solutions he might have tried had he been writing a generation earlier or a decade later. Around 1960, unfortunately, French Canada presented Hartz with the awkward dilemma of abandoning his theory or denying obvious facts.

Hartz met these difficulties by complicating his theory. He deftly added a vague reference to some ur-ism more primitive than feudalism, without which feudalism cannot produce the future. “The answer . . . is that the full *ancien régime* did not move outward, a full ‘Spain,’ a full ‘France’” (*FNS*, 27). The fragments apparently left behind the seminal principle that generates liberalism and socialism. “Feudalism itself, so to speak, shrank.” Not only that, but it shrank differently, it seems, depending upon whether it was heading North or South, for “the breakdown of organic medievalism” takes a different course in French Canada than it does in Latin America. Of French Canada it is possible to say that it was “a bit of medieval France, picked out and preserved for the curious student of social evolution” (*FNS*, 27). Nothing comparable can be said about the 20 republics of Latin America, with their 200 or so wars of national liberation, military coups, imported monarchies, palace revolts, socialist revolutions, and general turbulence.

It is to this thought-provoking passage that Hartz appends his long footnote. It deals with the difficult question whether one can rightly call Latin America “feudal,” especially since “the development of classical

10 Compare Soderlund, Nelson and Wagenberg, “Critique of the Hartz Theory,” 67.

11 Compare Preece, “Liberal-Conservatism and Feudalism,” 137.

feudalism was inhibited" in the Iberian peninsula itself, at first by the Moors and later by the centralized monarchy of Ferdinand and Isabella. This question leads directly to the larger one, whether it is right to use simple models—Hartz's tripartite "European ideological categories"—to describe complex realities:

The value of the European ideological categories is not that they fit completely, but that they give us a point of analytic departure. They permit us to seize the phenomenon of fragmentation by employing comparatively the experience of the European whole which is governed by those categories. Once this is accomplished, we are not prevented in any sense from appreciating deviations in the fragment from the European archetypes. On the contrary, we are provided with a context which makes those deviations meaningful. . . . The categories of the Western revolution are like any historical categories man can devise: they neither "perfectly fit" nor exhaust historical experience, but they help to illuminate a relevant portion of it (*FNS*, 28).

This echo of Max Weber and others raises two further questions: (a) In what sense do the categories Hartz has in mind "govern" or "fit" "the European whole"? and (b) Is Hartz free to use any categories he pleases, or are there right names for things?

The first question is obviously a very difficult one, long disputed by the Europeans themselves. Is there a natural progression from feudalism through liberalism towards the "last" "future" of "socialism," or are there other ways of telling the story of mankind, other possible termini, and other more fundamental categories? The followers of Marx have tended to favour the first of these alternatives, generally speaking, while their opponents have favoured the second. Is Europe a "whole" governed by a single law of development, or is it part of a larger whole, and itself a collection of warring nations, so that the "psychic magic" of "the national emotion" tends to divert the course of history from the path laid down by Marx and Engels? Again the Marxists tend to favour the first alternative, their opponents, the second. Is there any natural pattern of historical development determining the transition from one state of society to the next, or are there just choices to be made, and human beings free to make these choices, so that nothing can be said with certainty about the future? Marxists in the past were again inclined to choose the first alternative, their opponents, the second. But here an important qualification is necessary. Since 1917, and especially since 1933, Marxists have shifted, for obvious reasons, from insisting upon "laws of development" and "historical inevitability" to talking about "consciousness" and "the relative autonomy of the superstructure." Hartzian analysis is best understood as part of that fundamental shift within Marxism.<sup>12</sup>

The second question is still more difficult. Is the analyst free to sum up past experience using any categories, provided only that they offer "a

12 Compare Horowitz, "Notes," 383-85.

point of analytic departure"? Is he free, for example, to say that French Canada a hundred years ago was essentially a Protestant society, adding by way of excuse or mitigation that the term is being used "broadly" and that it was a Protestant society distinguished from others in its class by a large element of Catholicism? Hartz is clearly a conceptual libertarian. He says, in effect, that we need some organizing scheme when writing history; no such scheme will ever be simply right; so we are free to use any one that gives us a point of analytic departure. Even bad fits may give us what we need.

It is hard to know what to make of this principle. But perhaps one simple conclusion may be drawn: the Hartzian analyst will not be much disturbed by discrepancies between his classifications (or descriptions) and what others may regard as "hard facts." The Hartzian analyst has ample theoretical resources to handle even embarrassing facts.

This conclusion has great relevance for the Hartzian discussion of English Canada. To turn from French Canada to the Hartzian treatment of English Canada, and to begin sifting the evidence that bears on the disagreement among Hartz's followers about the importance of English Canada's "tory touch," would be straining gnats after swallowing a camel. The relevant facts are much less clear than they are in the case of French Canada. English Canada must still be discussed, however, for it is there that Hartzian analysis has taken hold.

#### 4. The Essential Argument

Horowitz objected to the tendency of Hartzian analysts to treat English Canada and the United States as essentially the same: "In North America, Canada is unique," he insisted ("CLS," 143; *CLP*, 3). Hartz had allowed that "it would be a blind traveller indeed who did not sense the difference between Ottawa and Kansas City, Kansas City and Cape Town" (*FNS*, 34). The difference he had sensed between Ottawa and Kansas City was Ottawa's "Tory streak coming out of the American Revolution" (*FNS*, 34). This "streak" or "touch" must be noted in any description of English Canada, but it does not distinguish English Canada *fundamentally* from the United States or South Africa. "In the case of the bourgeois fragments the unifying themes are even more marked than in the case of Latin America and French Canada" (*FNS*, 34). In particular, there is the same dynamic of fragmentation in English Canada as in the United States, the same ideological immobility, and the same atrophy of the future. "There may be a Tory touch in English Canada, but the fragment, despite the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of recent times, has not yielded a major socialist movement" (*FNS*, 34).

McRae, charged with the detailed presentation of English Canada, had also stressed similarities rather than differences. "The central figure

of the English-Canadian tradition [is] the American liberal" (*FNS*, 234). English Canada began with the arrival of the Tories or Loyalists after the American Revolution, but they were not "a genuine Tory aristocracy or a privileged class" because the American Revolution was not a genuine social revolution (*FNS*, 235). Their "convictions" may have differed in some respects from those of the Americans they left behind, but the differences were "subtle, minor" (*FNS*, 238-39). Toryism or Loyalism is "a differentiating quality that distinguishes the Canadian fragment from its American origins," but its importance should not be exaggerated; "for many historians it has obscured the all-important parental relationship between them" (*FNS*, 239). Their most important family resemblance is their common reaction to industrialism. The American liberal fragment developed a powerful labour movement without being significantly attracted to socialism, and "in broad terms, Canada has done the same" (*FNS*, 269).

How important is the "touch" or "streak" of Toryism that all agree distinguishes Canada from the United States? Horowitz plainly wanted to stress what Hartz and McRae implicitly denied—the legitimacy of socialism as an element of Canadian political culture derived from Canada's Tory past. His essential argument was that "non-liberal British elements [had] entered into English-Canadian society *together* with American liberal elements at the foundations" and that consequently liberalism today "is accompanied by vital and legitimate streams of toryism and socialism which have as close a relation to English Canada's 'essence' or 'foundations' as does liberalism" ("CLS," 156; *CLP*, 19).<sup>13</sup>

Horowitz began his paper by insisting on the strength of socialism in Canada: "In the United States, organized socialism is dead; in Canada socialism, though far from national power, is a significant political force" ("CLS," 143; *CLP*, 3). The problem was to explain this difference. Many relevant hypotheses could be considered. For example, Canada is more British than the United States and Canada's "organized socialism" is the best imitation of the British Labour party that can be managed in the circumstances. Or Canada's cabinet-parliamentary system of government requires stricter party discipline than the American presidential-congressional system and is thus more likely to spawn third parties. Or immigrants with Marx in their luggage arrived later in Canada than in the United States and have not yet been assimilated. Or the Canadian political culture is touched by toryism and thus naturally produces and welcomes socialist ideas. Horowitz favoured this last hypothesis. He drew a sharp contrast between English-Canadian and American political culture—but also carefully conceded that others would be within their rights to describe things differently.

13 Compare McRae, "Hartz's Concept of the Fragment Society," 21-23, and Horowitz, "Notes," 387-88.

[T]he United States is the perfect bourgeois fragment, the "archetype" of monolithic liberalism unsullied by tory or socialist deviations, [while] English Canada is a bourgeois fragment marred by non-liberal "imperfections"—a tory "touch," and therefore a socialist "touch." The way Hartz and McRae would put it is that English Canada and the United States are "essentially" alike; differences are to be found but they are not "basic." Surely, however, whether one describes the differences as delicate, subtle, and minor or as basic, significant, and important depends on one's perspective, on what one is looking for, on what one wishes to stress ("CLS," 148; *CLP*, 7).

Horowitz was looking for a political-cultural, rather than a more strictly "Hartzian," explanation for the "differing weights of Canadian and American socialism" ("CLS," 149; *CLP*, 8). Horowitz rejected the Hartz-McRae contention that English Canada's Tory touch is so delicate, minor, subtle, and generally unimportant that one can say of Canada, as of the United States, "no toryism in the past; therefore no socialism in the present" ("CLS," 148; *CLP*, 7). Hartz and McRae are right about the ideological climate in which socialism grows, Horowitz seems to have thought, but wrong about the Canadian climate.

### 5. Toryism Explains Socialism?

Since 1776 liberalism has become entangled with American nationalism in complicated ways, so that today any basic criticism of liberalism smells of treason to Americans. In adapting Hartzian analysis to English Canada, Horowitz did not simply turn this Hartzian argument around. There is remarkably little about nationalism in Horowitz's paper, given its provenance, and a great deal more than one would expect about "toryism" and "corporate-organic-collectivist ideas." The heart of its argument is the claim that "the tory and socialist minds have some crucial assumptions, orientations, and values in common, so that from certain angles they may appear not as enemies, but as two different expressions of the same basic outlook" ("CLS," 158). Both tories and socialists reject the liberal idea of society as merely "an agglomeration of competing individuals," and both reject, therefore, "the liberal idea of equality," which is "equality of opportunity" ("CLS," 144). A political culture with a touch of toryism will be more receptive to the characteristically socialist concern for "the good of the community as a corporate entity" ("CLS," 154; *CLP*, 16), according to Horowitz, and the demand for equality there will tend to take a socialist form, namely, "equality of condition rather than mere equality of opportunity" ("CLS," 147; *CLP*, 6). Socialist parties will tend to flourish there—at least by comparison with their untimely death in purely liberal political cultures.

A full analysis of the Hartz-Horowitz model would involve a lengthy investigation of its central but obscure notion of

"corporate-organic-collectivist ideas."<sup>14</sup> Does tory collectivism have very much in common with socialist collectivism, or do they resemble each other only very loosely, like sandbars and snack bars? Such a digression is fortunately unnecessary here, since both Horowitz and his critics have taken a different tack. Horowitz presented his interpretation of Canadian political culture as an explanation for the greater strength of socialism in Canada than in the United States.<sup>15</sup> His critics have disputed the factual basis of this explanation rather than its conceptual intricacies. Are the relevant ideologies found in Canada and do they co-exist or follow one another historically as the theory claims?

The simplest objections of this sort rest on the mismatch between feudalism/toryism and socialism in the different regions of the country. The problem of feudalism without socialism in French Canada (or Quebec) has already been mentioned. A similar problem comes to light if the Maritimes and the West are compared. Toryism is said to be strong in the Maritimes, but socialism seems to be stronger in the West.<sup>16</sup> Two prairie provinces equally lacking in feudalism or toryism, Alberta and Saskatchewan, have had very different experiences with socialism.<sup>17</sup>

Rod Preece has denied the presence in the Canadian political culture of the kind of toryism required by the Hartz-Horowitz theory.<sup>18</sup> He presents modern English-speaking conservatism as an outgrowth of British Whig rather than Tory thinking and he denies, in effect, the connection Horowitz makes between Canadian Toryism (or Loyalism) and corporate-organic-collectivist thinking (or toryism). "Toryism as a philosophy in Britain was moribund by 1688; as an ideology even, it was

14 It would be improper to anticipate the results of such an investigation, but one cannot help having hunches or working hypotheses. Mine would be as follows: politics makes strange bedfellows, but only from a very odd angle do the clearest spokesmen of the "tory" or pre-modern outlook and modern radical egalitarians seem to be expressing essentially the same ideas. While some similarities can no doubt be found, the differences are basic, significant, and important.

15 At one point Horowitz lists five things that he claims are explained by Canada's touch of toryism ("CLS," 150; *CLP*, 9). The first, second, and fifth items on the list are really just the explanatory factor itself in different words, but the fourth item is clearly distinct: "(d) the presence of an influential and legitimate socialist movement in English Canada as contrasted with the illegitimacy and early death of American socialism." Connected with this is "(c) the ambivalent centrist character of left-wing liberalism [i.e., the Liberal party] in Canada as contrasted with the unambiguously leftist position of left-wing liberalism in the United States [i.e., the left wing of the Democratic party]." The connection is: "King's Liberal Reform, since it had to answer attacks from the left as well as from the right, projected a notoriously ambivalent conservative-radical image" ("CLS," 163; *CLP*, 31).

16 Compare Preece, "Liberal-Conservatism and Feudalism," 136-37.

17 Compare Wiseman, "Pattern of Prairie Politics."

18 Preece, "The Myth of the Red Tory," and his "The Anglo-Saxon Conservative Tradition," this *JOURNAL* 13 (1980), 3-32, and "The Political Wisdom of Sir John A. Macdonald," this *JOURNAL* 17 (1984), 459-86. Compare Horowitz, "The 'Myth' of the Red Tory?"

ceasing to have influence by 1789, though it would be revived in novel form in the Victorian era by Carlyle and Disraeli."<sup>19</sup> Canada's Conservative or Tory politicians have been part of the mainstream of modern conservatism best represented by Burke, whose appeal to history was as remote in principle from traditional Tory thinking as from the doctrinaire liberalism he opposed. "If Locke is, as is commonly assumed, the stimulus for a moderate liberal Whiggism, Burke is the philosopher of a moderate conservative Whiggism."<sup>20</sup> There are no traces of absolutism or romanticism, no reservations about commerce or modernity generally, Preece maintains, in such archetypal figures as Hamilton and Macdonald. "It should be perfectly clear that the occasional use of the state by the Conservatives [as in establishing the CBC] should give us no reason to believe that they had a 'corporate-organic-collectivist' ideology, or any remnants of one."<sup>21</sup>

A critic determined to find fault could find faults on the "left" side of Horowitz's causal chain similar to those Preece has detected on its "right." The socialism that is notably stronger in Canada than in the United States is the "organized socialism" of the CCF and the New Democratic party, defined by the platforms and policy statements of these parties and the speeches and writings of their leaders. How exactly does this Socialism differ from the liberalism of the Liberal Reform represented by King and Roosevelt, and how is it nourished by toryism? Because some members of the CCF called themselves socialists, can it be assumed without further evidence or discussion that the CCF represented the kind of socialism "which combines the corporate-organic-collectivist ideas of toryism with the rationalist-egalitarian ideas of liberalism" ("CLS," 144; *CLP*, 5) and which should be stronger, therefore, in a political culture with a "tory touch" than in a purely liberal political culture? Perhaps some varieties of socialism are essentially liberal. Do all socialists mix ideas in the same way? Are there some socialisms that are essentially "corporatist" or "tory" and others that are not so at all?

Simple inspection of the Regina Manifesto does not answer these questions, but one learns that the members of the CCF aspired to build "a Cooperative Commonwealth in which the principle regulating production, distribution and exchange will be the supplying of human needs and not the making of profits."<sup>22</sup> To this end class conflict is

19 Preece, "The Myth of the Red Tory," 8.

20 Ibid., 20.

21 Ibid., 15.

22 See H. D. Forbes (ed.), *Canadian Political Thought* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985), 241-50. There is some interesting fine print in League for Social Reconstruction, *Social Planning for Canada* (Toronto: Nelson, 1935), 283: "The efficiency of a concern and the need for its services will be tested on a profit and loss basis. Generally speaking, enterprises which yield a large profit will be pushed, and

to be temporarily increased—the practical point of most socialist rhetoric—and then sharply reduced, after the brief transition period during which the planned economy is being fully worked out, by the general acceptance by the people as a whole of the decisions about wages, prices, and profits made by the cabinet, the National Planning Commission, the central bank, the National Investment Board, and the managing boards of the socialized industries, who will in the future exercise in the public interest the authority now concentrated under capitalism in the hands of “a small group of capitalist magnates,” who use it “in their own interest.”<sup>23</sup> The sections on “Agriculture” and “Cooperative Institutions” express the grievances of the farmers against “monopolistic corporations” and outline various practical proposals designed to increase farm income and to ensure “the security of tenure for the farmer upon his farm” (that is, his private ownership of his most important means of production). The sections dealing with “Labour Code” and “Socialized Health Services” deal with various familiar elements of the welfare state—unemployment insurance, accident insurance, old age pensions, “state regulation of wages” (so that there will be “equal reward and equal opportunity of advancement for equal services, irrespective of sex”), and “publicly organized health, hospital, and medical services.” Populism, paternalism, and planning seem to be the keynotes of the document. Later statements of the Canadian Socialist faith put less emphasis on machinery and more on the principle that public ownership does not cure all ills. David Lewis, for example, recognized that politicians and planners, too, can be “bourgeois,” and he made it clearer that the equality pursued by Canadian Socialists was equality of opportunity, not equality of condition.<sup>24</sup>

It is not at all clear how this Socialism differs fundamentally from what is commonly called liberalism. Essentially the same democratic welfare-state ideology seems to be found under the label “socialism”

those which involve a loss will be eliminated. Labour and investment will be applied where earnings are highest. Industry will be carried on in accordance with a rigorous examination of returns.”

- 23 Again the fine print is interesting: “The achievement of socialist economic ‘equality’ does not preclude the payment of wages and salaries of differing amounts, within reasonable limits. It is both necessary and desirable that the more skilled and able workers should receive higher wage rates than those who are not so valuable to industry and therefore to the community. But a differential system of wages and salaries, sufficient to reward and to encourage initiative and ability adequately, . . . might be such that no annual salary or wage, even for the highest official, would exceed \$10,000, while the lowest, for an adult, would be at least \$1,200. Within these limits there is ample room for a system of differential payments for all classes of workers” (ibid., 372-73).

- 24 See “A Socialist Takes Stock” (1956), in Forbes (ed.), *Canadian Political Thought*, 290-300.



("of the CCF/NDP") in Canada and "liberalism" ("of the left wing of the Democratic party") in the United States,<sup>25</sup> an objection reinforced by the results of a study by Roger Gibbins and Neil Nevitte, which analyzes data from questionnaires given to students in ten American universities in 1979 and nine Canadian universities in 1983.<sup>26</sup> Gibbins and Nevitte conclude that American political thinking differs from Canadian, but not in the way Horowitz implied. Americans seem to be further left, on the average, than English Canadians, and more polarized between left and right. Moreover, the clear majority of American students who put themselves on the left of the political spectrum, when compared to the minority of English-Canadian students who did so, were more likely to endorse policies aiming at equality of condition, not just equality of opportunity. "Simply put, the US left is farther to the left than is the English-Canadian left."<sup>27</sup> When the right sides of the political spectrum were compared, no significant differences were found. "Overall, the English-Canadian and American rights were ideologically indistinguishable, offering no support for the belief that the Canadian right is distinguished by a 'Tory streak.'"<sup>28</sup>

In short, the more closely the phenomena of Canadian and American politics are examined the less impressive is the explanatory power of the Hartz-Horowitz theory. This is partly a matter of perspective, but not entirely so. Hartzians pride themselves on painting big pictures. But there is a big difference between a big picture made up of many fine details and a big picture that dissolves into a mess of blobs and streaks upon closer inspection.

## 6. Down with Negative Thinking!

The captious critic quickly wears out his welcome: "If Hartz and Horowitz are so wide of the mark, why is their approach important? Why is it so popular? Surely they must get *some* things right?" Indeed they do. Horowitz, in particular, makes an important contribution to the study of Canadian politics when he treats conservatism and socialism as elements of a single ideological system in Canada. His theory is an

25 Compare Lipset, "Radicalism in North America," 41-46, 52-55, and Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics*, 33, 35; "The young men who became New Dealers in the United States became CCFers in Canada.... In the United States, the liberal Democrats have absorbed the socialists.... The American socialists of the thirties have been *aufgehoben* in the Democratic party." It is a curious and perhaps a significant fact that Michiel Horn deals with the relation of socialism to liberalism in Canada very briefly and without mentioning Hartz or Horowitz (*The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada, 1930-1942* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980], 99-103).

26 Gibbins and Nevitte, "Canadian Political Ideology."

27 Ibid., 588.

28 Ibid., 589.

antidote to simple-minded accounts of Canada as a "North American nation." He is rightly grouped with George Grant and others who offer a deeper and more subtle account of Canada's political culture.

Horowitz is surely correct to distinguish Canadian conservatism from the American variety: the former is associated historically with loyalty to the Crown and opposition to revolution; the latter has a more complicated ancestry and a more obvious problem in making something coherent out of conservative principles, including patriotism, and revolutionary practices. Canadian conservatism thus has a different tone and different intellectual structure from American conservatism; it has played a more legitimate and perhaps more influential role in public life.<sup>29</sup>

Yet Canada's distinctive conservatism is hard to define, as Horowitz recognizes when he speaks of liberalism with a tory touch. Familiar labels, drawn from the history of party politics in England or America, may describe some of its manifestations but distort others. W. L. Morton once summed up Macdonald's conservatism as follows: "inspired through Elgin by the Peelites of the Pittite tradition."<sup>30</sup> A French-Canadian contemporary of Macdonald with an equal claim to be regarded as an outstanding representative of Canadian conservatism, Bishop Bourget, would not be very well described in these terms. Perhaps no simple definition is possible.<sup>31</sup>

Horowitz sees that truth in modelling is no simple absolute, but a matter of perspective and intended effect. Practical considerations are inescapable, when the task is to sum up a complex historical tradition. A new or unconventional interpretation of a nation's history can give powerful support to one or another of its political factions. The desire to influence future events can override the desire to describe the past accurately, since the future will be determined in part by the interpretations of the past that are commonly accepted.

Accurate description requires attention to detail, but detail must be related to larger patterns and problems. For Canadian conservatism, this means first of all putting it in its American context, without distorting or obliterating its distinctive features, as Horowitz stipulates. The great intrinsic interest and practical importance of the basic problem of American conservatism, in a world of revolutionary states, sometimes tempts observers to dismiss Canada's indigenous conservatism as mere stodginess and resentment of the Americans.

29 See Lipset, "Historical Traditions and National Characteristics," for a recent review of much of the relevant literature.

30 W. L. Morton, "Canadian Conservatism Now" (1959), in Forbes (ed.), *Canadian Political Thought*, 305.

31 See George Grant, *Lament for a Nation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), 68-74; also *Technology and Empire* (Toronto: Anansi, 1969), 68.

Horowitz is right to resist this temptation and to emphasize the continuing relevance of Canada's anti-revolutionary origins for understanding even its contemporary politics. Our Conservative leaders who sail with the breezes have to reckon with a significant current of Red Toryism that someone like Reagan can afford to ignore.

Objections have been raised against Horowitz's interpretation of Red Toryism and Canadian political thought as a whole. One can see merit in these objections without being persuaded that the interpretation is fundamentally wrong. The objections can be dismissed as quibbles, requiring minor adjustments in the familiar formulae, not treated as threats to Horowitz's central contention: that the key to understanding Canadian politics is the elusive distinction between a tory corporate-organic-collectivist conception of the common good, preserved in socialism, and a liberal individualist conception, illustrated above all by the United States.

The task is to preserve the genuine insights of the Hartzian approach while overcoming the difficulties associated with Horowitz's theory about "corporate-organic-collectivist ideas." Hartz's treatment of liberalism in the United States is helpful here, for it shows the importance of national feeling in political thinking. It suggests a simpler and more robust connection between Canadian Toryism and Canadian Socialism than the one Horowitz stresses.

## **7. The Magic Touch**

National feeling is an important factor strengthening some ideologies and weakening others. Both Hartz and Horowitz emphasize this principle. Both stress the close connection between nationalism and liberalism in the United States and the foreignness of socialism there. The broad questions about political thinking and group loyalties raised by their perceptive observations are best approached by considering more closely what Horowitz has to say about the exceptional strength of socialism in Canada.

As already explained, Horowitz contends that socialism emerges naturally and inevitably from the Canadian political tradition. It was immanent from the beginning. But he also recognizes that socialism has been strengthened in Canada by the direct infusion of socialist ideas from Great Britain. Radical-minded British immigrants, as well as English Canadians educated in British universities or looking to Britain for models of political and cultural excellence, have helped to implant Britain's Fabian, Labour party socialism in Canada. How much attention should be given to toryism when explaining Canadian socialism, and how much to the British model and British immigrants? Horowitz does not pretend to be able to say, although this is plainly a

question of some practical as well as theoretical importance.<sup>32</sup> He stresses rather that "socialism was not alien here": it fitted with a political culture that already contained nonliberal components and it was not borne by foreigners, since many of its leaders were British immigrants with past experience in the British labour movement or the children of such immigrants. "And in British North America, Britons could not be treated as foreigners" ("CLS," 159; *CLP*, 24). In the United States, by contrast, socialism has always been un-American, "a socialism *in* America but not *of* America" ("CLS," 161; *CLP*, 28). When there was a significant socialist movement in the United States, especially during the first quarter of this century, it did not fit the monolithically liberal American political culture—except as by definition it was part of that culture. It had the great handicap of being borne by European immigrants who generally speaking did not look or sound like Americans. Their socialism was Marxist, and in the words of W. D. Howells, whom Hartz quotes, it "[smelled] to the average American of petroleum, [suggested] the red flag, and all manner of sexual novelties, and an abusive tone about God and religion" (*LTA*, 243). Hartz emphasizes the remarkable faithfulness of this American Marxism to its European theoretical heritage; undaunted by its failures, practically immune to its environment, it was dominated by foreign controversies (*LTA*, 235-37). The European preoccupations of the movement are understandable, of course, given its "heavily European" composition—"foreigners from Germany and other continental European countries," as Horowitz describes them ("CLS," 159; *CLP*, 24-25). Of the four leaders of American socialism Horowitz mentions—De Leon, Berger, Hillquit and Debs—three were born outside the United States of Jewish parents. "It is impossible to understand the differences between American and Canadian socialism without taking into account this immense difference between the ethnic contexts of socialism in the two countries" ("CLS," 160; *CLP*, 25).

Perhaps Hartz's most valuable contribution to the study of American political thought was his subtle analysis of the linkage between liberalism and nationalism—the "rampant Lockian nationalism" (*LTA*, 236)—among Americans. Liberalism and nationalism are often thought to be inherently opposed, and no doubt in some sense they are. But just as different colours can be blended, so can different ideologies. Liberalism and nationalism, for example, can be blended to make American liberal nationalism (or national liberalism). Such a blending is best understood, Hartz suggests, as something

32 Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics*, 16, and "Notes," 388-89. There is important detail relevant to this point in Tom Truman, "A Critique of Seymour M. Lipset's Article 'Value Differences, Absolute or Relative: The English-speaking Democracies,'" this *JOURNAL* 4 (1971), 497-525.

practical and emotional. It is the gradual, scarcely conscious product of an intolerable situation. It is psychologically intolerable, Hartz says, for a country, distinguished from other countries by particular institutions and a particular way of life, to be merely part of some larger whole, subordinate to that whole and constantly reminded of its subordinate status by the very language in which its affairs are discussed ("colonial," "petty bourgeois," "stodgy"). Practically speaking, only one thing can be done: the part must become its own whole. It must "discover itself," put new labels on its institutions and activities ("American," "democratic," "Tory"), forget its past, and teach its new language of politics to future immigrants. Individual and collective pride dictate that the fragment ideologist have no real understanding of his place in this natural process. He will cobble together some unimpressive little system from the limited ideological resources of the fragment, detached from the whole of the classical European social struggle (conservative vs. liberal vs. radical), but he will gain, almost because of his intellectual limitations, something extremely valuable in practice, something the European ideologist would die a thousand deaths to have, "the national emotion," which will make him virtually unbeatable. "A man may quarrel with a concept, but dare he shout down the national anthem? Dare he defy the spirit of a race?" (*FNS*, 15-16).

In the case of the United States, this complex process is able to produce a collectivity, bound together emotionally, with a clear sense of corporate identity, reacting like a single organism to stimuli from abroad, yet none the less fundamentally liberal, no more open than it was at the outset to the corporate-organic-collectivist thinking associated with nationalism (as an "ism" rather than an emotion). Indeed the liberalism in question becomes, by virtue of its link to nationalism, absolute, irrational, dogmatic, tyrannical, compulsive, intolerant, and, if pressed, hysterical.

Never was the intolerance and hysteria of American liberalism vis-à-vis alien ideologies more apparent than in the years following the First World War, when, for example, Eugene V. Debs was condemned to 10 years in prison and Victor Berger to 20, simply because they were socialists. Americans had begun condemning socialism as un-American around the time of the Paris Commune, according to Hartz (*LTA*, 218), but it was immediately after the Russian Revolution, when the new USSR challenged the United States for the leadership of progressive humanity, that the identification of Americanism with liberalism became particularly clear.

The emotional mechanics Hartz and Horowitz highlight could easily be illustrated in other contexts. Thus European conservatism, generally speaking, has been strengthened by its relation to dominant nationalities and its exploitation of national feeling, while opposing radical movements, Marxist or socialist, have drawn their support, not

so much from their universal class, the proletariat, as from oppressed ethnic and national minorities. In Eastern Europe, for example, communism has been linked historically with Slavo-Macedonian nationalism; it has had greater appeal for Slavs, generally, than for non-Slavic peoples like the Turks and the Germans; and it has had a special appeal for Magyars outside Hungary and for Jews in countries like Poland.<sup>33</sup> In Malaya, communism was a distinctively Chinese movement, exploiting the theme of Chinese racial unity, but in South Vietnam communism was linked to Vietnamese nationalism and the local Chinese tended to side with the opponents of the Vietcong.<sup>34</sup> In the United States, 20 years ago, leftist protest attracted disproportionate support from Blacks and Jews,<sup>35</sup> while in West Germany the New Left has been called "a channel for expressing a heavily veiled form of German nationalism."<sup>36</sup>

English Canada can easily be brought under the broad generalization suggested by these examples. Canadian national feeling has almost always been anti-American. There is room for learned controversy about the influence of tory principles among the Loyalists, but no room for doubt about their antipathy to the new American regime. Nor is there much room for doubt that nineteenth and twentieth-century British immigrants reinforced the typically English-Canadian attitude of rivalry with the United States. Given this attitude, it would not be surprising if English Canadians today tended to favour un-American political options. And given the influence of the American media on the Canadian mind, it is surely not surprising that Canadians generally define "un-American" the same way Americans do. In English Canada socialism benefits, not just from the tory touch in our past, but also from the "psychic magic" of "the national emotion" today. Nationalism favours socialism (and other un-American doctrines) in English Canada.

## 8. Nationalism Explains Socialism?

The great strength of the Hartz-Horowitz theory is the simple and appealing explanation it provides for the "hard fact" ("CLS," 149;

33 R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

34 Lucian W. Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956). South Vietnam has been the graveyard of many simple theories, not least that it is easy to generalize about the politics of the Overseas Chinese. The main facts are summarized by Garth Alexander, *Silent Invasion: The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: Macdonald, 1973), 123-27. I am grateful to Huỳnh Kim Khánh for help on this point.

35 See especially Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, *Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the New Left* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), and the many studies cited there.

36 Cyril Levitt, *Children of Privilege: Student Revolt in the Sixties* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 77.

CLP, 9) that “organized socialism” is stronger in Canada than in the United States. The explanation rests upon a simple law (“if toryism yesterday, then socialism today”) and an incontestable fact (“Toryism yesterday”). The law is rationalized by speaking of the common corporate-organic-collectivist content of toryism and socialism. A related explanation appeals to an equally simple law (“if anti-American nationalism today, then Socialism today”) and a more relevant initial condition (“anti-American nationalism today”). This law, too, can be rationalized by talking about the common corporate-organic-collectivist content of two ideologies, nationalism and socialism.<sup>37</sup>

Common content does not always establish a firm bond between different ideologies, however. Socialism, for example, is generally said to be linked with cosmopolitanism and internationalism against nationalism. It proclaims the solidarity of the working class, decries imperialism, and looks forward to the establishment of the republic of mankind. National independence, however attractive an ideal in itself, is not the same ideal as social revolution. Nationalists tend to blame outsiders and ethnic minorities for the nation’s troubles rather than their own rulers. Socialists do the opposite, at least until they attain power. National solidarity is inconsistent with class conflict. Nationalism encourages glorification of the past and it tends to protect the status quo from critical scrutiny. Nationalist rhetoric has often proved the strongest weapon in the hands of socialism’s enemies. National Socialism is a horrible warning of the practical consequences of ideological confusion.

Hartz doubtless had these things in mind when he coupled nationalism with *liberalism* in the United States, contrasting both with socialism. He does not seem to have been very troubled, when making this contrast, by the common corporate-organic-collectivist content of nationalism and socialism. Certainly he did not look to American nationalism to rescue American socialism. Americans would have to *overcome* their nationalism, Hartz maintained, before they could appreciate the charms of socialism. The only nationalism that could rescue socialism in America, he implied, was the nationalism of friendly foreigners arriving with the latest ideological baggage.

Everything seems to change, however, when Hartz is applied to Canada by Horowitz. It is like turning a corner in a house of mirrors: what had had a lean and hungry look suddenly looks plump and contented. Nationalism is now the natural ally of socialism against the anti-communist and anti-socialist frenzy of the nation’s traditional rival.

Horowitz published an important essay in 1967 that frankly discussed the impediments to the projected ideological coupling and that

37 Compare Christian and Campbell, *Political Parties and Ideologies*, 209, 215-16.

clarified the *arrière-pensées* of a socialist about it.<sup>38</sup> He removed the impediments by means of a distinction between two types of nationalism, one that is bloodthirsty, aggressive, disruptive, racist and doctrinaire, and the other that is defensive, integrative, and tolerant of both racial and doctrinal diversity. Conceding that nationalism has sometimes been a malevolent force tending to bathe the world in blood, Horowitz insisted that Canadian nationalism has the opposite tendency. It is the nationalism of a small state struggling to preserve its independence, not the nationalism of an expansionist great power. It is comparable to Finnish nationalism or the nationalism of Eastern European and Balkan peoples caught between giants. Great power nationalism is never justifiable, Horowitz asserted, but small state and anti-colonial nationalisms almost always are. "The shedding of blood is simply not in this [small state, anti-colonial] picture." Moreover, Canadian nationalism is not the disruptive sort that dismembered the Austro-Hungarian Empire and that threatens the Indian and Nigerian states today. These are "usually accompanied by bitter chauvinistic hatred of neighbouring peoples and often result in the shedding of blood." But Canadian nationalism—aside from the fringe of separatists and Orangemen who want to dismember the country—is integrative; it opposes chauvinism and bloodshed. "Canadian nationalism has nothing to do with race, nothing to do with blood and soil. Canadian nationalism does not lead to Auschwitz. It simply leads away from Washington." Finally, Canada's nationalism is not even doctrinal: it does not perceive the Canadian nation "as the embodiment of a specific set of values, such as Communism, Liberalism, Catholicism and fascism," does not hurl anathemas against rival values, and does not relate to the outside world in a paranoid manner. It is neither isolationist nor messianic. It contrasts in all these respects with American nationalism. The American doctrine—"liberalism, individualism, and 'democratic capitalism'"—is rigidly imposed on all within the country's borders. "Adherents of other ideologies are, at best, barely tolerated deviates and at worst, witches to be burned at the stake." Citizens of other countries are, for the paranoid Americans, either corrupters to be shunned or infidels to be converted.

It is ironic in the extreme, Horowitz pointed out, that Canadian moderates quake with terror at the thought that Canadian nationalists might try to build a Chinese Wall around Canada to restrict the free flow of ideas, turning Canadians in on themselves and pressing them all into a single ideological mould. In fact, the integrative nationalism of a small state like Canada is the one potentially effective force against rigid ideological conformity. Canadian nationalism is not directed to

38 "On the Fear of Nationalism," in Forbes (ed.), *Canadian Political Thought*, 364-68. In the following paragraphs so much is quoted from these few pages that I have dispensed with specific references.



preserving some unique set of Canadian national values, for no such set exists. "We are a muddle, nothing definite." The aim is to make something good of this muddle.

It needn't be uniquely Canadian as long as it isn't a copy of the United States. It could be anything. It could be a replica of Sweden, or if you like, of North Korea, Albania or Ireland, or Spain or Yugoslavia, or Cambodia, or all of them. The point is not to preserve *all* aspects of Canadian society which differentiate it from the American simply because they are *uniquely ours*, but to preserve those distinctive aspects of Canadian society which make it *better* than American society and above all, Canada's freedom of action to *become something*—who knows what it will be—different from Flint, Michigan.

The point, as Horowitz explained, is to keep the Canadian mind open to possibilities the American has rejected. America is now stuck with Americanism; Canada can still be something different and better. Economic independence must be achieved. The production and distribution of ideas must be released from "a dam of *market* forces, by assigning a very high priority to the subsidization of Canadian cultural production of all sorts [anything that can be published or broadcast], on a scale very much larger than anything contemplated at the moment." When Canada has become something definite and good, something clearly different from the United States, then it will be time enough to worry about chauvinism, paranoia, and Chinese Walls.

The socialism that exploits national feeling to broaden its popular appeal can be described as a kind of national socialism (as in Yugoslavian socialism, African socialism, or the Polish road to socialism), but it would be libelous to suggest that Horowitz had anything in mind like National Socialism, which rather exploited the rhetoric and techniques of socialism to broaden the appeal of nationalism. Horowitz approved of nationalism only in so far as it served the purpose of building socialism in Canada. Canadian nationalism was useful because of Canada's traditional rivalry with capitalist America. Socialists like himself were nationalists, he pointed out, *because* they were socialists. If the United States had been socialist when he was writing, he would have been a continentalist. "If the possibilities of building a socialist society were brighter in the United States than in Canada, or as bright, we would not be terrified by the prospect of absorption. We are nationalists because, as socialists, we do not want our country to be utterly absorbed by the *citadel of world capitalism*."<sup>39</sup>

Horowitz concluded by calling for a "common front" of Canadian nationalists of all political parties and all ideological persuasions. He maintained that only socialism, in the long run, can preserve Canadian independence, "because only socialism can decisively and fully eliminate the power of the 'international' corporations over the

39 Compare Horowitz, "Notes," 387.

Canadian economy.” But in the short run socialism, as a “minority ideology,” needed the help of Canadian nationalists, liberals, pacifists, and tories.

The amount of socialist gold mixed in an ideological alloy is sometimes hard to determine, but in this case three touchstones can be applied: the treatment of national traditions; the question of world government, and belief in the possibility of socialism. Horowitz clearly favoured a nationalism oriented to the future rather than the past. Canada is a favourable environment for progressive social experiments, he maintained, because it is still a non-nation. The nationalism he favoured should not be confused with the kind of sentimental, flag-waving local boosterism that continentalists make a show of to draw the teeth of nationalism. Horowitz favoured a nationalism with teeth, but not one that stood in the way of world government. He and other nationalist socialists were nationalists, he said, “not in the sense that we want to keep Canada forever out of all future mergers of nations, but in the sense that we want to keep Canada out of the *United States* in the foreseeable future.” Nationalists sometimes minimize the differences between capitalism and socialism, treating both as subordinate to the grim imperatives of technology. Horowitz, by contrast, clearly dreamed socialist dreams—“the establishment of the republic of mankind, a world in which inequality among nations will be abolished together with every other form of useless and unjust inequality . . . the withering away of the nation-state and perhaps of the state itself.” Like any great political dream, of course, socialism comes with no money-back guarantee. As Horowitz said in a different context, all doctrines of historical inevitability are unreasonable, since nothing can be known to be inevitable until it happens.<sup>40</sup> But in 1967 Horowitz believed that his dream would not be brought “one centimetre closer to realization”—barring some unexpected quirks in the historical machinery—by integrating Canada with the citadel of world capitalism.

## 9. Theoretical Perspectives

Any further investigation of nationalism in relation to ideologies like liberalism and socialism would take us far from the topic of this article, which is the influence of Hartzian ideas on the interpretation of Canadian political thought. The surprising fact, as noted at the outset, is the greater popularity of Hartzianism in English Canada than in the United States. Why this striking difference in the fortunes of Hartzianism in two very similar societies?

Any attempt to account for the difference must be grounded in a careful examination not just of Hartzian principles, and their

40 “Tories, Socialists and the Demise of Canada” (1965), in Forbes (ed.), *Canadian Political Thought*, 358.

modification by Horowitz, but also of the specific histories, institutions, and beliefs of English Canadians and Americans. A comparative study of English-Canadian and American societies is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study. It must suffice here to review briefly some of the main features of the Hartzian approach.

Hartzian analysis recognizes that ideas are important in politics. It is not sufficient, in order to understand a society, to study only its socioeconomic base—its level of technology, laws of property, forms of industrial organization, conflicts of material interests, and so on. Hartzians insist on the importance, as well, of political ideas like liberalism and socialism. This feature of the Hartzian approach has a strong intuitive appeal.

Hartzian analysis also recognizes that immigrants bring ideas along with their household effects and that immigrants from different countries or different periods tend to bring different ideas. The explicit recognition of this simple principle, so important for understanding nations of immigrants such as Canada and the United States, goes far in explaining the popularity of Hartzianism. It is an antidote to the narrow specialism of North American social science which tends to deal with immigration as a topic in Sociology and to ignore its relation to Government and Political Theory.

Hartzian analysis gains much strength from its realistic treatment of the United States as a fragment of Great Britain and of English Canada as a fragment of the United States. American political thinking is analyzed as a variation on a basic European theme, and Canadian political thinking as a variation on the American theme, comparing and contrasting first the American with the European, then the Canadian with the American phenomena. This approach might have had little appeal to Canadians or Americans in the past, when there was a strong tendency to link Canada directly to Great Britain, as part of an Empire, in fundamental opposition to the United States.<sup>41</sup> But today it is obviously more appropriate to deal with Canada and the United States as independent North American nations, conditioned by the same basic environment, sharing a common historical experience, but differing in the details of their institutions and political cultures.

Hartzian analysis sensibly highlights Lockian liberalism in the underpinnings of North American society. Hartz seems to have been writing against an older view of American political thought—the view from Harvard rather than from Europe—that emphasized the Puritanism rather than the liberalism of American origins.<sup>42</sup> Much can,

41 Compare Glazebrook, *A History of Canadian Political Thought*.

42 In the Preface to *The Liberal Tradition in America* Hartz wrote that he "cannot fail to associate this book with Benjamin F. Wright, my Harvard tutor, now President of Smith College, who years ago communicated to me a lasting interest in the

of course, be said about the importance of Puritanism in the founding of New England. But Puritans were not important in all the North American colonies; there are obvious difficulties saying that modern America has an "absolute," "irrational," "fixed," "dogmatic," "compulsive," or "tyrannical" attachment even to Christianity, let alone Puritanism; and the founders of modern America—men like Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson—were obviously not Puritan divines.

The strength that Hartzian analysis derives from its concentration on Locke is related to a fifth feature of the approach, its shrewd appreciation of the need for judicious simplifications and abridgements. Hartz, for example, begins his study of the liberal tradition in America at 1776. Horowitz develops his analysis of the Canadian political tradition around the "hard fact" that socialism is stronger in Canada than in the United States. Both are aware that an author cannot decide how to sum up all he has to say about the past and present of a society like English Canada without considering his audience and what effect he wants to have on it. Sweeping generalizations that electrify one audience may start another laughing or put it to sleep.

Hartzian analysis encounters some difficulties, however, because its formulae clash with well known and important facts. Its problem with French Canada has already been noted. Its treatment of socialism in North America is vulnerable to the observation that this ideology was once much stronger in the United States than in Canada, a difference that can easily be related to Canada's Tory traditions, with unsettling effect. The approach suffers, as well, from its tendency to simplify complex ideas. Hartz and Horowitz insist that Locke's ideas are important, for example, but say little about what those ideas are or why they are important. In their writings there is almost no mention of Locke's predecessors, no discussion of his complex relations to Christianity, and no appreciation of the subtlety of his thought. They evince little interest, generally speaking, in what exactly is "Lockian" about "liberal society." This neglect of fundamentals leaves their approach open to statistical attack and changes in historical fashion.<sup>43</sup> The approach is further handicapped, particularly when addressing a

comprehensive interpretation of American history" (*LTA*, vi). See in this connection Hartz's remarks about Puritanism as a "titanic explanatory force" (*LTA*, 23, 54); and Wright's books, *A Source Book of American Political Theory* (New York: Macmillan, 1929) and *American Interpretations of Natural Law: A Study in the History of Political Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931). Just as Hartz's "feudalism" obscures the Catholicism of New France, his "liberalism" obscures the Puritanism of New England.

43 Donald S. Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984), 189-97, illustrates the danger.

Canadian audience, by the way it groups societies. It has difficulty doing justice to the unity and rivalry of English and French Canada. Hartzian analysis sometimes proceeds as if English and French were "two societies" in the same sense that, say, Argentina and Peru are "two societies." Hartzian analysis draws strength from its recognition that immigrants are not Lockian blank slates, but it suffers from a poverty of detail about their favourite books.<sup>44</sup> Finally, the Hartzian recognition of the importance of ideas, sensible and refreshing though it is, is also limited and grudging. Under analysis it reveals an obstinate attachment to the old story about three classes (top, middle, and bottom), three periods of history (rule of the top, rule of the middle, and rule of the bottom), and three corresponding ideologies (toryism, liberalism, and socialism).

This review of the main features of the Hartzian approach goes a long way towards explaining its limited appeal. The approach shares its most appealing features with a number of competitors: for example, it is not alone in treating America as an offshoot of Europe, or "the superstructure" as "relatively autonomous," or Locke as important. Its main distinguishing features—its neglect of religion, its simplistic theory of ideological progress, its sentimentalism about turn-of-the-century American socialism, and its disdainful equation of American liberalism with emotional nationalism—have a limited appeal.

An approach which searches out and concentrates on broad common features of Hartzianism wherever it is found cannot, however, help us to understand the unusual popularity of this mode of analysis in English Canada. A more fruitful explanatory technique, I have suggested, is to examine the interaction between Hartzianism and nationalism in English Canada and the United States. With only slight modification, Hartzian analysis harmonizes almost perfectly with the most common kind of English-Canadian nationalism, and it puts the "psychic magic" of "the national emotion" on the side of Socialism, popular among Canadian academics. Is it any wonder, then, that it is frequently taught to university students in Canada? In the United States, by contrast, Hartzianism goes against the national grain, and it is an unacceptable theory even to socialists, since it implies that there can be no indigenous American socialism. We have here the explanation we seek for the greater popularity of the Hartzian approach in Canada than in the United States.

44 One of the merits of Nelson Wiseman's "Hartzian" interpretation of the prairie provinces ("The Pattern of Prairie Politics") is its un-Hartzian attention to relevant detail. See also Wiseman, "An Historical Note on Religion and Parties on the Prairies," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 16 (1981), 109-12.